THE Iraqi civil war is not only a sectarian-tinged conflict, but also a power struggle among different Shi’ite militias, the result of which will determine the future of Iraq.
Iranian regime is investing heavily on training, arming and financing militias it backs to dominate, if not control, Iraq. Billions of dollars are spent while ordinary Iranians are suffering from poverty and hunger.
Last month, Ali Akbar Saari from the Iranian Health Ministry angered Iranians when he said, “30 per cent of the Iranian population is suffering from poverty and hunger, while tens of billions of dollars worth of oil revenues getting wasted in financing terrorist organisations or in wars that Iran has nothing to do with” (Gulf News, August 25).
Perhaps the increased involvement of Iran in the internal affairs of Iraq came after the Islamic State (IS) terrorists started to gain momentum and control swaths of territories. That was a turning point where Iran decided to send its own soldiers and advisers, and attempted to replace the Iraqi government army with its own proxy groups. It was a successful venture and today the Shi’ite militias are stronger than the government army.
However, there seems a bitter power struggle among the different groups Iran has established. In addition, there are nationalist Iraqis who don’t subscribe to the Iranian principles but seek a secular administration. This scenario muddies Iraqi politics and indicates a remote chance of return of stability to the country, even if IS is gone for good.
The Popular Mobilisation Units (Hashid Al Shaabi) and allied forces are key instruments in the fight against IS. However, they are also blamed for sectarian assassinations, extra-judiciary killings, looting and violence in areas liberated from IS.
The Iraqi government was aware of this misuse and abuse of power by Hashid, but preferred to keep a low profile because they are doing what the Iraqi army failed to deliver – defeating IS.
Thus, as they liberate more territories from IS, Hashid became strong and turned into a de facto independent army with little or no government control.
Recently, the Iraqi government proposed to integrate the Hashid forces with the Iraqi Security Forces, to bring them under its control, and bar them from engaging in politics, but with little success.
Iran is trying to capitalise on this development and is planning to transform Hashid and allied forces into an independent ‘political-cum-military’ party similar to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. It will be controlled, directed and financed by Iran. Establishment of such a party ensures Iran’s interest in Iraq is preserved, irrespective of future political changes.
Hashid and most of the Iran-backed powerful Iraqi Shi’ite militias including the Badr Organisation, Asaib Ahl Haq, Kataib Hizbollah, Harakat Al Nujaba – all established and financed by Iran – seem to have supported the idea.
The sharing of power among them, however, remains a thorny issue. This is in contrast to the interests of some nationalist Shia groups including the powerful Moqtada Al Sadr’s Peace Brigade (the Sadr movement), formerly Al Mahdi army, which remains loyal to Iraq rather than Iran.
The Sadr movement is trying to transform itself from a military contingent into a political force and mobilise the public for protests demanding formation of a new technocrat government. Recently, a protest staged by its followers in the Green Zone of Baghdad witnessed clashes with police and claimed some causalities.
Power struggle among Iran-backed militias and nationalists is looming large.
Iran’s involvement in Iraqi affairs has endangered its stability. Iraq’s future seems bleak, say analysts.