For as long as I can recall, Israelis have sought recognition and acceptance from the Arab world without reciprocity. At times, they have made the argument that if the Arab states simply recognised them as a normal state in the Middle East then they would feel secure enough to make accommodations with the Palestinians.
In 2002, in an effort to test Israel’s commitment to achieving a comprehensive peace that would result in its recognition and acceptance, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah announced an Arab Peace Initiative.
The API, which was later unanimously endorsed by the Arab League, contained the following elements:
If Israel were to agree to a full withdrawal from the occupied territories to the pre-June, 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian State in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem and an agreed upon solution for the Palestinian refugee problem; in exchange, the Arab states will consider the Arab-Israeli conflict over and will sign a comprehensive peace agreement and establish normal relations with the State of Israel.
Giving lie to their interest in finding a peaceful and just solution to the conflict, Israel has repeatedly rejected the API, insisting that the Arab states normalise without preconditions. In making their case, US policymakers have used the Israeli argument that if the Israelis felt more secure they would be more open to compromise with the Palestinians.
Time and again, we have seen clear evidence that this is simply not true – normalisation with Israel doesn’t advance peace.
A few examples come to mind:
During the lead-up to the Madrid Peace Conference, the Bush administration proposed to the Arab states that they offer a “sweetener” to the Israelis which they hoped might entice the Israelis to be more accommodating. What they suggested was that if the Arabs agreed to end their secondary boycott of businesses that did business in Israel, then the administration would press the Israelis to accept a freeze on settlement construction in the occupied territories. Several key Arab governments informed the US administration that they would do so. The secondary boycott was ended. The Madrid Peace Conference happened. But the settlement freeze never materialised.
I remember, in 1994, making my first trip with a delegation of Arab American and American Jewish business leaders to Israel/Palestine as co-chair of Builders for Peace, a project launched by Vice President Al Gore. On that visit, I saw visual evidence of the betrayal that had occurred at Madrid. As we left Jerusalem heading towards Ramallah, we could see on hill after hill settlement construction taking place at a feverish pace. The secondary boycott ended, the settlements had not.
The following year’s summit took place in Amman. Palestinian political leaders were there, as were the representatives of the American and Israeli governments and their business communities. But Palestinian businessmen and women from the occupied territories were not present. Israel had denied them exit permits and so they were not allowed to cross the Allenby Bridge to attend the summit.
While in Amman, I fought back and insisted that if the Palestinians couldn’t come to us, then we would bring our group of business leaders to them. We met a few days later in a hotel in Jerusalem. We waited for more than an hour and a half for the Palestinian business leaders to come. Finally, we received a call from the Palestinians who informed us that they were stuck at a check point because the occupation authorities were refusing them permission to enter the city. The Israeli government officials apologised; the planned meeting adjourned; and that was the end.
What comes through so clearly from these examples and others is that the Israelis have simply never operated in good faith vis-a-vis their dealings with the Arab World, and most especially with the Palestinians. They take and they do not reciprocate. That is why I say “Don’t be fooled. Normalisation doesn’t advance peace and it most certainly doesn’t advance Palestinian rights.”