It is well known by many that in 1953 the head of the CIA in Tehran had a verbal clash with Kermit Roosevelt about the immorality of such operations, but now facts show that Kermit was ordered by Eisenhower personally.
Newly classified documents reveal the CIA to have been mostly a bystander in the Iranian coup...
By RAY TAKEYH
William Faulkner once mused that the past is never dead, in fact it’s not even past. The story of the coup that toppled Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953 may not be dead, but it is unhinged from history. Tall tales by a scion of the American establishment – former CIA agent and presidential grandson Kermit Roosevelt – and reams of studies by left-wing professors have sustained the myth that the Eisenhower administration ousted Mossadeq. The Iranians are mere bystanders in this story, watching helplessly as a malevolent America manipulates their nation’s destiny. Most academic speculations remain cloistered in college campuses, but the myth of Mossadeq’s overthrow long escaped those boundaries.
It is in the Democratic party that the tale of Mossadeq’s demise has found its most hospitable home. In 2015, Barack Obama confided to Tom Friedman, “if you look at Iranian history, the fact is that we had some involvement with overthrowing a democratically elected regime in Iran.”
If a little history is a dangerous thing, in the hands of Democratic party luminaries, it is quite lethal.
Ambitions
Last month, the State Department finally released a cache of documents that John Kerry had embargoed as he pursued his arms control ambitions with Iran. It is unlikely that the former secretary of state actually read the documents, but always mindful of the mullahs’ sensibilities, he chose to suppress history in the name of diplomacy. Those sceptical of the standard account of the coup will find in the files more evidence that the mythmakers were wrong. The newly declassified records provide valuable insight into the confused atmosphere that permeated the US intelligence community that fateful summer. It is hard to read these cables and come to the conclusion that America overthrew Mossadeq.
The proper place to begin is a brief recapitulation of the crisis. For decades, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) had exploited Iran’s oil, paying less revenue to Tehran than taxes to the British treasury. The rise of postcolonial nationalism in the aftermath of the Second World War made such anachronistic arrangements untenable. As the European empires crumbled, their assets became fair game for the newly independent nations. Mohammad Mossadeq was one of Iran’s more esteemed politicians, having fought his entire life for his country’s autonomy and dignity. Had his career ended in parliament, he would be remembered as one of Persia’s greatest patriots. The tragedy of Mossadeq is that he became prime minister, a post unsuited to his temperament.
Mossadeq’s intransigence made a negotiated settlement nearly impossible. The prime minister and his allies dismissed compromises that would preserve any aspect of British power.
Even at the height of the Cold War, the Truman administration played the role of an honest broker. This was not the first time that Harry Truman had saved Iran. In 1946, when Joseph Stalin planned to take over the northern Iranian province of Azerbaijan, it was Truman who rebuffed the Soviet dictator. The map of Iran might well look different today had America not stood up for Iran’s sovereign rights at the risk of precipitating the Cold War’s first crisis. It was Tehran, more than London, that brushed aside all such arrangements.
The pressure of governing during a time of crisis accentuated the darker shades of Mossadeq’s personality. The onetime champion of the rule of law now rigged elections and unleashed crowds to intimidate his political opponents.
Even before Western intelligence services devised plots against Mossadeq, his party the National Front started to crumble.
Among Iran’s factions, the clergy would play the most curious role. As it has with most historical events, the Islamic Republic has whitewashed the role that the mullahs played in Mossadeq’s downfall. The most esteemed Shia cleric at that time, Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Hossein Borujerdi, initially supported the nationalisation act and encouraged the shah to oppose Britain’s imperial designs. The National Front’s liberal disposition, however, unsettled the clerical order.
Still, it was the mayhem on the streets rather than the National Front’s legislative goals that most disturbed the clerical class in the summer of 1953.
The rabble rouser Ayatollah Abdel Qassem Kashani might have led the charge against Mossadeq from his perch as the speaker of parliament, but behind him stood a clerical cohort antagonistic to the prime minister. Iran’s rulers today should not be granted their claim that the seminary had no role in Mossadeq’s overthrow.
By 1953, America had a new president, the victor of the Second World War, Dwight Eisenhower. Given the gravity of the situation, he soon grew concerned that Mossadeq’s unfolding dictatorship of the left could easily slide into Communist rule. Mossadeq had rejected a string of settlement proposals and was not even superficially interested in negotiations. In the meantime, Iran’s domestic stability continued to deteriorate, empowering radical forces on both the left and the right.
The recently released documents highlight the dilemmas that Eisenhower faced in Iran. America’s formidable ambassador Loy Henderson warned the White House, “During [the] last six months there has been sharp shift in basis [of] Mossadeq support among political leaders. Most elements [of the] original National [Front] movement now (repeat now) [are] in open or tacit opposition.”
It was hard to see how Eisenhower could take advantage of Mossadeq’s mishaps, however, when he was informed by his intelligence services that the “CIA presently has no group which would be effective in spreading anti-Mossadeq mass propaganda” and the “CIA has no group in Iran which could effectively promote riots demonstrating against Mossadeq.”
It was the Iranians, more than the CIA, who initially offered Eisenhower a path out of his predicament.
Understanding
The newly declassified documents shed much light on the role that the clergy played. Most scholars of the coup have long acknowledged that Kashani was involved in opposition activities. In an intriguing cable, the CIA noted that General Fazlullah Zahedi, a distinguished soldier and onetime member of Mossadeq’s cabinet, reported that “Kashani, Borujerdi and [Ayatollah Muhammad Reza] Behbahani were reaching an understanding on the need to bolster the Shah in resistance to Mossadeq.”
By April, we see that the basic elements of the coup were in place largely independent of American participation. The plan was essentially for the shah to sack Mossadeq in favour of Zahedi.
The Iranian planning and pleading finally pressed Washington to be more directly involved in the plot to unseat Mossadeq. Roosevelt went to Iran to oversee the operation, code-named the TPAJAX Project or Operation Ajax. The scheme concocted with the participation of Britain’s MI6 rested on the shah dismissing his prime minister. The CIA would seek to rekindle Britain’s network of agents to instigate crowds only to realise that London had overstated their value.
The coup was finally launched on August 13 when the shah issued a decree dismissing his premier. Mossadeq seemed to have been tipped off about the shah’s decision and quickly arrested the officer dispatched to dismiss him. The shah, true to form, fled the country. It is important to stress that the prime minister’s defiance of the shah’s decree was unconstitutional.
In the chaotic and confused atmosphere of Tehran, political fortunes swiftly changed. By August 19, the second coup began. As the events rapidly unfolded, the CIA station reported that the “Army [is] still basically [with the] Shah” and “Religious leaders now desperate. Will attempt anything. Will try [to] save Islam and Shah of Iran.” Far from being in command of the situation, the agency’s representatives in Tehran cabled that as of August 13, “CIA cut out of military preparations by [General Nader] Batmangeliche and Zahedi.”
Zahedi and his men had planned well and were in position to take over key facilities with dispatch. Mossadeq was too much of an aristocrat to spend his life in hideaways and soon surrendered to Zahedi’s forces. Thus ended Mohammad Mossadeq’s tumultuous tenure.
In Washington, the shock of the royalist restoration triggered calls for reports from the local officials. Ambassador Henderson, in his role as the United States’ chief representative in Iran, informed the White House that the protesters “seemed to come from all classes of people including workers, clerks, shopkeepers, students, et cetera.” This stands in stark contrast to professors and pundits who insist that the demonstrations were mere collections of thugs paid by the CIA and its accomplices.
The newly declassified documents do much to undermine Roosevelt’s later tales. In August 1953, the Iranians reclaimed their nation and ousted a premier who had generated too many crises that he could not resolve. The institution of the monarchy was still held in esteem by a large swath of the public. And the shah commanded the support of all the relevant classes, such as the military and the clergy. Mossadeq’s unpopularity and penchant toward arbitrary rule had left him isolated and vulnerable to a popular revolt. America might have been involved in the first coup attempt that failed, but it was largely a bystander in the more consequential second one. Although Kermit Roosevelt would go on to inflate his role, the other American diplomats and spies should be credited for the integrity of their reports and the acknowledgment of their own surprise at the turn of events.
It is unlikely that the professoriate and the American left will abandon their myths about 1953. They are too invested in their narrative and too obsessed with defending the Islamic Republic to defer to history’s judgment. The clerical complicity in the demise of Mossadeq is sure to embarrass the theocratic regime that has gained much from Roosevelt’s legendary story. The documentary disclosures and declassifications may not nudge the left in the right direction, but for those with an open mind, the case is now closed.
– Weekly Standard