In modern warfare, battles no longer begin with missiles – they begin with narratives. Long before the first projectile is launched, a story is already in place defining who the aggressor is, who the victim is, and who should bear the blame. Anyone observing the political and media discourse surrounding Gulf security will recognise that the real battle is fought not only at sea or in the skies, but also in the minds of people. Narratives are carefully crafted, concepts are reshaped, and Gulf citizens are encouraged to view their own national security through someone else’s lens and to accept equations that ultimately serve only the interests of others.
The most dangerous aspect of such political discourse is not an explicit threat, but the attempt to reshape public consciousness until people believe they have only two choices. This is precisely the message repeated whenever statements by certain Iranian officials are amplified by media outlets and echoed by some Arab voices, presenting a false equation as though it were an undeniable fact: either stand with Iran or you will be considered in Israel’s camp.
In reality, this is not a political equation but an intellectual trap designed to deny the Gulf states the sovereign right to define their own interests and security according to their national priorities.
This becomes increasingly evident whenever I watch discussion programmes on some Arab-funded television channels dealing with Iran’s blatant aggression against the GCC states. While Gulf perspectives are largely absent from Iranian media platforms, some Arab outlets have given extensive space to the Iranian narrative – a level of media openness that invites question marks, especially in the absence of any reciprocal treatment.
Even when the speakers are not Iranian, the Iranian narrative often finds Arab advocates willing to adopt and reproduce it, to the point where it appears that Iran has more unofficial spokespersons than the official ones that it needs.
Regrettably, many of the Arab participants who present themselves as specialists in Iranian affairs possess only a superficial understanding of Iran, its history and the foundations of its power. The English proverb, “A little knowledge is a dangerous thing,” applies perfectly here. Indeed, incomplete knowledge can be more dangerous than ignorance itself.
Iran’s history differs fundamentally from that of many other nations. Persian historical thought has not been built solely on verifiable historical facts, but has been profoundly shaped by the Shahnameh and its ultranationalist author, Abolqasem Ferdowsi, who relied heavily on mythology to construct a Persian national consciousness that often contradicts the established historical record of pre-Islamic Persia.
Anyone following debates on these television platforms will quickly notice how discussions often turn against the interests of the region, promoting Iranian claims regarding American military bases while overlooking the contradictions within Iran’s own official discourse. At one moment, Tehran speaks of good neighbourly relations; at another, it issues messages of pressure or implicit threats towards the Gulf states. Statements by some Iranian officials frequently carry a tone of superiority that is incompatible with genuine confidence-building. They appear to mistake the strategic restraint shown by the GCC states during the recent crisis for weakness, overlooking the fundamental reality that such restraint reflected not vulnerability but a clear understanding that regional security is preserved through stability and balance - not through emotional reactions that could trigger open confrontation.
This is precisely why the false narrative portraying the Gulf states as leaning towards Israel must be challenged. The Gulf countries formulate their policies on the basis of national interests and sovereign decision-making, not alignment with any regional project.
What should be recognised by all is that the Gulf is not an arena for settling scores between competing regional powers. It is a region of sovereign states with every right to choose the security partnerships that best protect their national interests and security.
This leads us to the recurring debate over foreign military bases. A simple question deserves to be asked: why is the presence of such bases in Gulf countries repeatedly criticised, while Iran’s military presence and its network of proxies across several Arab states are largely ignored? The issue is not about defending any particular foreign military presence; it is about applying one consistent standard in assessing all forms of external intervention.
One of the most dangerous features of Iranian political discourse is its attempt to portray any Gulf defence cooperation with the United States or other partners as a moral failing, while presenting Iran’s own influence beyond its borders as entirely legitimate and even justified.
Recent developments provide ample evidence of this approach. Armed groups loyal to Iran have repeatedly acted on instructions from Tehran whenever pressure on the Iranian regime has intensified, seeking to inflame tensions in strategic areas such as Bab el-Mandeb or to fuel disputes between Iraq and Kuwait.
These developments clearly illustrate the escalatory approach adopted by Iran-backed militias in Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon - an approach that runs counter to the interests of their own countries and peoples.
If the Gulf states have succeeded in safeguarding their security on the ground, the next challenge lies in protecting public awareness from narratives that seek to redefine reality, reverse the roles of aggressor and victim, and portray the defence of sovereignty as the cause of regional crises.
Events have demonstrated that unless the Iranian regime abandons its expansionist and confrontational mindset – which assumes it has the right to impose its own vision of regional security on all neighbouring states – the prospects for genuine confidence-building will remain hostage to that approach, regardless of how often slogans of good neighbourliness are repeated.
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